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Abstract
By reducing the fear of a hostile takeover, business combination (BC) laws weaken cor-
porate governance and create more opportunity for managerial slack. Using the passage
of BC laws as a source of identifying variation, we examine if such laws have a different
effect on firms in competitive and non-competitive industries. We find that while firms in
non-competitive industries experience a substantial drop in operating performance, firms in
competitive industries experience virtually no effect. Though consistent with the general
notion that competition mitigates managerial agency problems, our results are, in partic-
ular, supportive of the stronger Alchian-Friedman-Stigler hypothesis that managerial slack
cannot exist, or survive, in competitive industries. When we examine which agency problem
competition mitigates, we find evidence in favor of a “quiet-life” hypothesis. While capital
expenditures are unaffected by the passage of BC laws, input costs, wages, and overhead
costs all increase, and only so in non-competitive industries. We also conduct event studies
around the dates of the first newspaper reports about the BC laws. We find that while firms
in non-competitive industries experience a significant decline in their stock prices, firms in
competitive industries experience a small and insignificant price impact.
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1 Introduction
It is a widely held view among many economists that product market competition mitigates
managerial agency problems.1 Views differ, however, when it comes to the issue of how “per-
fect” managerial incentives are in competitive industries. Some, like Leibenstein (1966), argue
that competition reduces managerial slack but stop short of claiming that it resolves all (X-)
inefficiencies. Others, like Alchian (1950), Friedman (1953), and Stigler (1958), go much further,
essentially arguing that managerial slack cannot exist, or survive, in competitive industries.2 If
managers seek to maximize their long-run income, and if inefficient firms are wiped out from
the market by the forces of competition (or “natural selection”), then, as Machlup (1967, p. 19)
concludes, “maximization of managerial income and maximization of profits come to the same
thing if competition is effective.”
The argument that managerial slack cannot exist, or survive, in competitive industries has
far-reaching implications.3 For instance, it implies that “the managerial extension and enrich-
ment of the firm was not needed except where firms in the industry were large and few, and
not under the pressure of competition” (Machlup (1967, p. 11)). In other words, topics that
have been studied extensively over the past decades, such as managerial discretion and agency
conflicts between shareholders and management leading to deviations from profit-maximizing
behavior, might have little bearing on firms in competitive industries.4 By implication, then,
1Despite its intuitive appeal, attempts to formalize the notion that product market competition mitigates
managerial agency problems have proven remarkably difficult. For example, while Hart (1983) shows that com-
petition reduces managerial slack, Scharfstein (1988) shows that Hart’s result can be easily reversed. Subsequent
theory models generally find ambiguous effects (e.g., Hermalin (1992), Schmidt (1997)). In an early review of
the literature, Holmström and Tirole (1989, p. 97) conclude: “Apparently, the simple idea that product market
competition reduces slack is not as easy to formalize as one might think.”
2Scherer (1980, p. 38) summarizes the argument as follows: “When forced into the trenches on the question of
whether firms maximize profits, economists resort to the ultimate weapon in their arsenal: a variant of Darwin’s
natural selection theory. Over the long pull, there is one simple criterion for the survival of a business enterprise:
Profits must be nonnegative. No matter how strongly managers prefer to pursue other objectives [...] failure to
satisfy this criterion means ultimately that a firm will disappear from the economic scene.”
3Not surprisingly, the Alchian-Friedman-Stigler hypothesis is highly controversial. Referring to Alchian (1950)
and Stigler (1958), Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 738) write in their survey of corporate governance: “While we
agree that product market competition is probably the most powerful force toward economic efficieny in the world,
we are skeptical that it alone can solve the problem of corporate governance.”
4Scherer (1980, p. 38-41) notes that organizational slack, “princely managerial salaries,” and income redistri-
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firms in competitive industries could, at least as a first approximation, be rightfully viewed as a
“profit-maximizing black box,” as is done by neoclassical price theory. Second, empirical studies
on corporate governance could benefit from including measures of industry competition, such
as the Herfindahl index (see also Conclusion). Finally, efforts to improve corporate governance
could benefit from focusing primarily on firms in non-competitive industries. Moreover, such ef-
forts could be broadened to include measures aimed at improving an industry’s competitiveness,
such as deregulation and antitrust laws.
To examine the empirical relevance of these arguments, we use exogenous variation in cor-
porate governance in the form of 30 business combination (BC) laws passed between 1985 and
1991 on a state-by-state basis.5 By reducing the fear of a hostile takeover, such laws weaken
corporate governance and create more opportunity for managerial slack.6 Typically, BC laws
impose a moratorium on certain kinds of transactions, including mergers and asset sales, be-
tween a large shareholder and the firm for a period usually ranging from three to five years
after the shareholder’s stake has passed a prespecified threshold. This moratorium severely hin-
ders corporate raiders from gaining access to the target firm’s assets for the purpose of paying
down acquisition debt, thus making hostile takeovers more difficult and often impossible.7 Like
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), we focus on BC laws because they are more stringent than
other antitakeover laws, providing a source of variation that can hopefully generate statistically
and economically significant results. For instance, Karpoff and Malatesta (1989) find that only
BC laws, but not fair price statutes or control share acquisition statutes, cause a negative stock
price reaction for the firms incorporated in passing states.
bution from stockholders to management are primarily a problem of firms possessing market power. By contrast,
“the natural selection process is a stern master in a competitive environment.”
5Many authors share the view that antitakeover laws are exogenous for all but perhaps a few firms motivating
the laws, e.g., Romano (1987), Karpoff and Malatesta (1989), Comment and Schwert (1995), Garvey and Hanka
(1999), Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999, 2003), Cheng, Nagar, and Rajan (2004), and Rauh (2006). Perhaps
the most prominent study using BC laws as a source of identifying variation is Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003).
The authors argue on p. 1045 that “[t]hese laws avoid the endogeneity problem to the extent that they are passed
by states and are not endogenously driven by firm-specific conditions.” We specifically address the potential
endogeneity of BC laws in our empirical study.
6Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003, p. 1045) note: “The reduced fear of a hostile takeover means that an
important disciplining device has become less effective and that corporate governance overall was reduced.”
7For background information on BC laws, see Sroufe and Gelband (1990) and Suggs (1995).
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Our identification strategy benefits from the lack of congruence between a firm’s industry,
state of location, and state of incorporation. For instance, a firm’s state of incorporation says
little about its industry. Likewise, only 38 percent of the firms in our sample are incorporated
in their state of location. BC laws, in turn, apply to all firms in a given state of incorporation,
regardless of their state of location or industry. This lack of congruence helps us to separate out
the effects of local and industry shocks contemporaneous with the BC laws from the effects of the
laws themselves (see Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003)). This addresses several concerns. First,
our estimate of the laws’ effects could be biased, reflecting in part the impact of contemporaneous
shocks. Second, our results could be spurious, coming entirely from contemporaneous shocks.
Third, and perhaps most important, economic conditions could influence the passage of BC
laws. For example, poor economic conditions in a particular state might induce local firms to
lobby for an antitakeover law in that state.
Using BC laws as a source of identifying variation, we ask a simple question. Assuming
these laws have an effect on firms’ operating performance (which is a testable assumption), does
the effect differ for firms in competitive and non-competitive industries? We obtain three main
results, which turn out to be robust across many specifications. First, consistent with the notion
that BC laws create more opportunity for managerial slack, we find that they have a negative
effect on operating performance. On average, the return on assets (ROA) drops by 0.6 percentage
points. Second, the effect becomes increasingly more negative the less competitive the industry
is. For example, ROA drops by 0.1 percentage points in the lowest Herfindahl quintile, but by
1.5 percentage points in the highest Herfindahl quintile. Generally, a one-standard deviation
increase in the Herfindahl index is associated with a drop in ROA of 0.5 percentage points.
Third, the effect is virtually zero and insignificant in highly competitive industries.
While all three results are consistent with the notion that competition mitigates manage-
rial agency problems, the third result, in particular, is supportive of the stronger hypothesis
by Alchian (1951), Friedman (1953), and Stigler (1958) that managerial slack cannot exist, or
survive, in competitive industries. We also try to examine which agency problem competition
mitigates. Does it curb managerial empire building? Or does it prevent managers from enjoying
a “quiet life” by forcing them to “undertake cognitively difficult activities” (Bertrand and Mul-
lainathan (2003, p. 1067))? We find no evidence for empire building: Capital expenditures are
seemingly unaffected by the passage of BC laws. By contrast, we find that input costs, wages,
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and overhead costs all increase after the passage of BC laws. Notably, this result is entirely
driven by non-competitive industries. In competitive industries, by contrast, the effect is vir-
tually zero and insignificant. Overall, our findings are supportive of a “quiet-life” hypothesis
whereby managers insulated from both takeover pressure and competitive pressure seek to avoid
cognitively difficult activities, such as haggling with input suppliers, labor unions, and individual
organizational units demanding bigger overhead budgets.8
To collect further evidence, we conduct event studies around the dates of the first newspaper
reports about the BC laws. On average, we find a small but significant cumulative abnormal
return (CAR) of −0.32%. While this is somewhat smaller than the average CAR of −0.47%
reported by Karpoff and Malatesta (1989), the numbers are roughly of the same order of mag-
nitude. Importantly, when we perform the event study separately for portfolios with low and
high Herfindahl indices, we find that the average CAR for the low-Herfindahl portfolio is close
to zero and insignificant, whereas the average CAR for the high-Herfindahl portfolio is −0.54%
and significant. A similar pattern emerges when we form three portfolios: While the average
CAR for the low-Herfindahl portfolio is again close to zero and insignificant, the average CARs
for the medium- and high-Herfindahl portfolios are −0.44% and −0.67%, respectively, both of
which are significant. Not only do these findings suggest that the stock market anticipates that
BC laws have a negative impact only on firms in less competitive industries, they also sug-
gest that the market knows that firms in high-Herfindahl industries fare worse than firms in
medium-Herfindahl industries.
This paper is the first to provide direct evidence of the Alchian-Friedman-Stigler hypothesis
that competitive industries leave no room for managerial slack. Given an exogenous increase
in the opportunity for managerial slack, we show that operating performance drops for firms
in non-competitive industries but not for firms in competitive industries. In terms of research
question, the paper most closely related to ours is perhaps Nickell (1996), who shows that higher
competition leads to higher productivity growth in a sample of U.K. manufacturing firms. While
consistent with a managerial agency explanation, Nickell’s finding is also consistent with alter-
native explanations. For example, firms in competitive industries may have higher productivity
growth because there are more industry peers from whose successes and failures they can learn.
8Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) come to a similar conclusion. The “quiet-life” hypothesis is closely
related to the expense-preference hypothesis, which posits that managers share rents with workers to have a more
comfortable life (e.g., Edwards (1977), Hannan (1979)).
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More generally, our paper is related to a growing literature that documents a link between
product market competition and corporate governance. Most papers find that (endogenous)
firm-level corporate governance instruments vary with industry competition. Examples include
managerial incentive schemes (Aggarwal and Samwick (1999)), board structure (Karuna (2007)),
and firm-level takeover defenses (Cremers, Nair, and Peyer (2006)), Karuna (2007)). Finally,
Guadalupe and Pérez-González (2005) show that competition affects private benefits of control,
as measured by the voting premium between shares with different voting rights. Their study is
especially interesting because it provides some first-hand evidence of the bankruptcy-risk channel
that also implicitly underlies the Alchian-Friedman-Stigler hypothesis.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data. Section 3 lays out
the empirical strategy. Section 4 presents our main results as well as robustness checks. Section
5 presents evidence from event studies. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
2.1 Sample Selection
Our main data source is Standard and Poor’s COMPUSTAT. All COMPUSTAT items are from
the annual data files, except for states of incorporation, which are from the quarterly files. To
be included in our sample, a firm must be located and incorporated in the United States. We
exclude all observations for which the book value of assets or net sales are either missing or
negative. We also exclude regulated utility firms (SIC 4900-4999).9 The sample period is from
1976 to 1995, which is the same period as in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), who consider
the same 30 business combination (BC) laws as we do.
These selection criteria leave us with 10,960 firms and 81,095 firm-year observations. Table
I shows how many firms are located and incorporated in each state. The state of location, as
defined by COMPUSTAT, indicates the state in which a firm’s headquarters are located. The
state of incorporation is a legal concept and determines, inter alia, which BC law, if any, is
relevant for a given firm. Unfortunately, COMPUSTAT only reports the state of incorporation
for the latest available year. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that changes in states of
9Whether or not we exclude regulated utilities makes no difference for our results. We also obtain similar
results if we exclude financial firms (SIC 6000-6999). Likewise, we obtain similar results if we consider only
manufacturing firms (SIC 2000-3999); see Section 3.2.
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incorporation are rare (e.g., Romano (1993)). To provide further evidence on this issue, Bertrand
and Mullainathan (2003) have randomly sampled 200 firms from their panel and checked if any
of these firms had changed their state of incorporation during the sample period. Only three
firms had changed their state of incorporation, all of them to Delaware. Importantly, all three
changes predate the 1988 Delaware BC law by several years. Similarly, Cheng, Nagar, and Rajan
(2004) report that none of the 587 Forbes 500 firms in their panel had changed their state of
incorporation during the sample period from 1984 to 1991.
2.2 Definition of Variables and Summary Statistics
Our measure of product market competition is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, which is well-
grounded in industrial organization theory.10 The Herfindahl index is defined as the sum of
squared market shares,
HHIjt :=
XNj
i=1
s2ijt,
where sijt is the market share of firm i in industry j in year t. Market shares are computed from
COMPUSTAT using firms’ sales (item #12). In robustness checks, we also compute market
shares using total assets (item #6). Our benchmark measure is the Herfindahl index based
on 3-digit SIC codes. The 3-digit partition is a compromise between too coarse a partition,
in which unrelated industries may be pooled together, and too narrow a partition, which may
be subject to misclassification. For example, the 2-digit SIC code 38 (instruments and related
products) pools together ophthalmic goods such as intra ocular lenses (3-digit SIC code 385)
and watches, clocks, clockwork operated devices and parts (3-digit SIC code 387), two industries
that are unlikely to compete against each other. On the other hand, the 4-digit SIC partition
treats upholstered wood household furniture (4-digit SIC code 2512) and non-upholstered wood
household furniture (4-digit SIC code 2511) as unrelated industries, even though common sense
suggests that they compete against each other. We will consider Herfindahl indices based on 2-
and 4-digit SIC codes in robustness checks.
A look at the empirical distribution of the Herfindahl index shows that it has a small “spike”
at the right endpoint, which points to misclassification. To avoid that outliers and misclassi-
fication drive our results, we drop 2.5% of the firm-year observations at the right tail of the
10See Curry and George (1983) and Tirole (1988, pp. 221-223).
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distribution.11 We will further address the issue of measurement error in robustness checks
by using Herfindahl dummies. Also in robustness checks, we will consider non-COMPUSTAT
measures of competition that are only available for manufacturing industries.
Our main measure of firms’ operating performance is the return on assets (ROA), which is
defined as operating income before depreciation and amortization (EBITDA, item #13) divided
by total assets (item #6). Since ROA is a ratio, it will take on extreme values (in either direction)
if the scaling variable becomes too small. To mitigate the effect of outliers, we drop 1% of the
firm-year observations at each tail of the ROA distribution. This reduces our initial sample of
81,095 firm-year observations. For instance, in column [1] of Table III, our final sample consists
of 81, 095 × 0.98 = 79, 474 firm-year observations. We will consider additional performance
measures in robustness checks.
The remaining variables are defined as follows. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets.
Age is the natural logarithm of one plus the firm’s age, which is the number of years the firm
has been in COMPUSTAT. Leverage is long-term debt (item #9) plus debt in current liabilities
(item #34) divided by total assets. E-Index is the entrenchment index by Bebchuk, Cohen, and
Ferrell (2005) and is obtained from Lucian Bebchuk’s webpage. G-index is the governance index
by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and is obtained from the IRRC database. Both indices
are only available for the years 1990, 1993, and 1995 during the sample period. Additional
COMPUSTAT variables will be introduced in Section 3.4.
Table II provides separate summary statistics for firms incorporated in states that passed a
BC law during the sample period (“Eventually Business Combination”) and firms incorporated
in states that did not pass a BC law (“Never Business Combination”). Splitting the sample
this way shows that firms in passing states are bigger and slightly older on average. On the
other hand, there are no significant differences with respect to leverage, Herfindahl index, and
E-index. That firms in passing states have a higher G-index is partly mechanical, because the
G-index assigns one index point if the firm is incorporated in a state that passed a BC law. That
firms in passing states are bigger and slightly older deserves more attention, because it raises
11The 3-digit partition comprises 270 industries. In some cases, the industry definition is quite narrow, with the
effect that some industries consist of a single firm even though common sense suggests that they should be pooled
together with other industries. By construction, these industries have a Herfindahl index equal to one, which
explains the small “spike” at the right endpoint of the empirical distribution. Dropping 2.5% of the firm-year
observations at the right tail of the Herfindahl distribution corrects for the misclassification.
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the question if the control group is an appropriate one.12 There are several reasons why this
should not be a serious concern. First, due to the staggering of the BC laws over time, firms in
the “Eventually Business Combination” group are both control firms (before the BC law) and
treatment firms (after the BC law). Second, we control for age and size in all our regressions.
Third, we show in robustness checks that our results are unchanged if we focus only on states
that passed a BC law during the sample period.
2.3 Empirical Methodology
Using a differences-in-differences approach, we examine whether the passage of 30 BC laws
between 1985 and 1991 affects operating performance differently depending on how competitive
the firm’s industry is. The basic equation we estimate is
yijklt = αi+αt+β1BCkt+β2Herfindahljt+β3 (BCkt ×Herfindahljt)+γ0Xijklt+ ijklt, (1)
where i indexes firms, j indexes industries, k indexes states of incorporation, l indexes states of
location, t indexes time, yijklt is the dependent variable of interest (e.g., ROA), αi and αt are
firm and year fixed effects, BCkt is a dummy variable that equals one if a BC law was passed
in state k by time t, Herfindahljt is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index for industry j at time t,
Xijklt is a vector of control variables, and ijklt is the error term.
The total effect of the passage of BC laws on operating performance can be computed as
β1+β3Herfindahl. The coefficient β1 measures the limit effect as the Herfindahl index goes to
zero. The coefficient β3 measures how the effect varies with product market competition, where
it should be noted that a higher Herfindahl index implies weaker competition. The coefficient
β2 measures the direct effect of competition on operating performance. Here, the conjecture is
that an increase in competition (lower Herfindahl index) reduces firms’ profits. We include age
and size as control variables in all our regressions to account for systematic differences between
the control and treatment groups (cf., Section 2.2).
The differences-in-differences approach is easily explained. The first difference compares
12The issue about the control group is that firms in passing and non-passing states may differ for reasons
unrelated to the passage of BC laws. If firms differ along endogenous dimensions (e.g., G-index), this may simply
reflect the fact that firms in passing and non-passing states make different choices. And yet, to address any
remaining concerns that firms in passing and non-passing states differ for reasons unrelated to the passage of BC
laws, we include leverage, E-index, G-index, and other variables as controls in robustness checks.
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operating performance before and after the passage of BC laws separately for firms in the
control and treatment group. This yields two differences, one for the control group and one for
the treatment group. The second difference takes the difference between these two differences.
The result is an estimate of the effect of BC laws on operating performance. The interaction
term BC ×Herfindahl allows us to estimate a third difference, namely, whether the BC laws
affect operating performance differently depending on how competitive the firm’s industry is.
Importantly, the staggered passage of the BC laws implies that the control group is not restricted
to firms incorporated in states that never passed a BC law during the sample period. The control
group includes all firms incorporated in states that did not pass a BC law by time t. Thus, it
includes firms incorporated in states that never passed a BC law during the sample period as
well as firms incorporated in states that passed a law after time t.
Our identification strategy benefits from the general lack of congruence between a firm’s
industry, state of location, and state of incorporation. For instance, a firm’s state of incorpo-
ration says little about its industry. Likewise, Table I shows that only 37.8% of all firms are
incorporated in their state of location. BC laws, in turn, apply to all firms in a given state of
incorporation, regardless of their state of location or industry. This lack of congruence allows us
to include industry- and state-year controls to account for industry shocks and shocks specific
to a state of location (see Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003)).13 The industry- and state-year
controls are computed as the mean of the dependent variable (e.g., ROA) in the firm’s industry
and state of location, respectively, excluding the firm itself.
The ability to control for local and industry shocks allows us to separate out the effects of
shocks contemporaneous with the BC laws from the effects of the laws themselves. This addresses
several concerns. First, our estimate of the laws’ effects could be biased, reflecting in part the
impact of contemporaneous shocks. Second, our results could be spurious, coming entirely from
shocks contemporaneous with the BC laws. Third, and perhaps most important, economic
conditions could influence the passage of BC laws. For example, poor economic conditions
in a particular state might induce local firms to lobby for an antitakeover law to gain better
13Table I shows that about 82% of the firms incorporated outside their state of location are incorporated in
Delaware. While this is an interesting fact of U.S. corporate law, it has no bearing on the identification of the
state-year coefficient. What matters is that the set of firms affected by a local shock is not congruent with the
set of firms affected by the BC law in the same state.
10
protection from hostile takeovers.14
While the inclusion of state- and industry-year controls can address concerns that the BC
laws are the outcome of lobbying at the local and industry level, respectively, it remains the
possibility that lobbying occurs at the state of incorporation level. However, as Bertrand and
Mullainathan (2003) point out, for this to be a serious concern, it would have to be the case
that a broad coalition of firms incorporated in the same state, which all experience a decline
in profitability and, in our case, additionally operate in less competitive industries, successfully
lobby for an antitakeover law in their state of incorporation. Given the evidence in Romano
(1987), who portrays lobbying for antitakeover laws as an exclusive political process, this seems
rather unlikely. Typically, antitakeover laws were adopted, often during emergency sessions,
under the political pressure of a single firm facing a takeover threat, not a broad coalition of
firms. Hence, for all but a few firms, the laws were exogenous.15
Similar to Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), we address the issue of broad-based lobby-
ing by investigating the dynamic effects of BC laws. Specifically, we replace the interaction
term in equation (1) with five interaction terms: Before(−2) × Herfindahl, Before(−1) ×
Herfindahl, Before(0)×Herfindahl, After(1)×Herfindahl, and After(2+)×Herfindahl,
where Before(−2) and Before(−1) are dummy variables that equal one if the firm is incor-
porated in a state that will pass a BC law in two years and one year from now, respectively,
Before(0) is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is incorporated in a state that passes
a BC law this year, and After(1) and After(2+) are dummy variables that equal one if the firm
is incorporated in a state that passed a BC law one year and two or more years ago, respectively.
If BC laws were passed in response to political pressure of a broad coalition of firms, then we
14Although we control for local and industry shocks, it should be noted that it is not obvious how these shocks
could explain our results. For example, local shocks would have to primarily affect firms in less competitive
industries. Likewise, industry shocks would have to primarily affect firms in less competitive industries. Moreover,
affected firms would have to be primarily incorporated in states that passed a BC law.
15Using newspaper reports (cf., Section 4), we have identified firms that motivated the passage of BC laws.
For example, the Minnesota BC law was adopted under the political pressure of the Dayton Hudson (now Target)
Corporation when it was attacked by the Dart Group Corporation. Similar to other studies (e.g., Garvey and
Hanka (1999)), we find that excluding such motivating firms does not affect our results. The view that antitakeover
laws are exogenous for all but perhaps a few motivating firms is shared by many commentators e.g., Romano
(1987), Karpoff and Malatesta (1989), Comment and Schwert (1995), Garvey and Hanka (1999), Bertrand and
Mullainathan (1999, 2003), Cheng, Nagar, and Rajan (2004), and Rauh (2006).
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should see an “effect” of the laws already prior to their passage. In particular, if the coefficients
on Before(−2) × Herfindahl or Before(−1) × Herfindahl were significant, this would be
symptomatic of reverse causation.
Another issue is the potential endogeneity of the Herfindahl index. The main concern here
is again reverse causation. Fortunately, as Nickell (1996) points out, reverse causation predicts
the opposite sign. It predicts that a drop in profits, possibly caused by the passage of BC laws,
leads to firm exits and higher industry concentration (higher Herfindahl index) in the long run.
Likewise, a boost in profits leads to entry of firms and lower industry concentration in the long
run. Hence, a negative coefficient β2 in equation (1) would be symptomatic of reverse causation,
while a positive coefficient would be consistent with the conventional interpretation that an
increase in competition reduces profits. To further address the issue of reverse causation, we use
lagged values of the Herfindahl index as well as the average Herfindahl index from 1976 to 1984
(the first BC law was passed in 1985) in robustness checks.
We cluster standard errors at the state of incorporation level in all our regressions. This
addresses two important concerns. First, the fact that all firms in a given year and state of
incorporation are affected by the same “shock” (namely, the passage of a BC law) may induce
correlation of the error terms within each state-year cell (Moulton (1990), Donald and Lang
(2007)). Second, and this is an intrinsic problem of the differences-in-differences approach,
the fact that the BC dummy changes little over time, being zero before and one after the
passage of the BC law, may induce serial correlation of the error terms (Bertrand, Duflo, and
Mullainathan (2004)). Either problem can lead to a serious understatement of the standard
errors. While clustering at the state of incorporation level is a natural choice in our case, given
that the BC dummy is a likely source of cross-sectional and serial correlation, we have verified
that our results also hold if we cluster at the state of location level. We will discuss alternative
methods to account for cross-sectional and serial correlation in Section 3.3.
3 Results
3.1 Main Results
While many economists would probably agree that product market competition reduces man-
agerial slack, some, like Alchian (1950), Friedman (1953), and Stigler (1958), go much further,
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essentially arguing that managerial slack cannot exist, or survive, in competitive industries (see
Introduction). We investigate the empirical relevance of these arguments by examining how
the passage of 30 BC laws between 1985 and 1991 affects operating performance depending on
how competitive the firm’s industry is. By reducing the fear of a hostile takeover, BC laws
weaken corporate governance and create more opportunity for managerial slack. If competitive
industries have less tolerance for slack than non-competitive industries do, then we should see a
smaller drop in operating performance, if any, in competitive industries.
Table III contains our main results. In column [1] we first confirm that the passage of
BC laws leads to a drop in operating performance. The BC dummy has a coefficient of −0.006,
which implies that ROA decreases by 0.6 percentage points on average. In column [3] we examine
how this drop in performance varies with product market competition. The interaction term
between the BC dummy and the Herfindahl index has a coefficient of −0.025, which implies
that the drop in ROA is larger for firms in less competitive industries. Of equal interest is that
the BC dummy is close to zero and insignificant. Since the BC dummy in column [3] captures
the effect as the Herfindahl index goes to zero, this implies that the passage of BC laws has
no significant effect on firms in highly competitive industries. Finally, note that the Herfindahl
index has a mean value of 0.226. We can thus compute the average effect of the passage of BC
laws as −0.001− 0.025× 0.226 = −0.007, which is similar to column [1]. Performing an F−test
shows that the BC dummy and the interaction term between the BC dummy and the Herfindahl
index are jointly significant at the 1% level.
Columns [2] and [4] show the same regressions but with control variables. The BC dummy
in column [2] has a coefficient of −0.006, which is the same as in column [1]. Hence, whether or
not we include controls, ROA drops by 0.6 percentage points on average. The control variables
all have the expected signs. The industry- and state-year coefficients are both positive and
significant, which shows that controlling for industry and local shocks is important. Size and
the Herfindahl index both have a positive coefficient, while age has a negative coefficient.16 The
insignificance of the Herfindahl index is due to the fact that it captures two different effects of
16We have experimented with squared terms for size, age, and the Herfindahl index to capture possible non-
linearities. Column [2] shows that the squared term for size is negative and significant, which implies that
the relationship between size and ROA is concave. The squared term for age was significant but rendered the
coefficient on age insignificant with almost no effect on the other estimates. All our results are similar if we include
age-squared instead of age. The squared term for the Herfindahl index was insignificant.
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competition on operating performance, which have opposite signs. As we will see below, when
we disentangle the two effects, they both become significant.
Column [4], which represents our “basic” regression, separates out the direct effect of compe-
tition on operating performance from the indirect managerial-incentive effect. The direct effect
is captured by including the Herfindahl index as a control variable. The Herfindahl index has
a coefficient of 0.025, which implies that an increase in competition reduces firms’ profits. The
coefficient is larger than in column [2], because the latter additionally includes the indirect effect.
The indirect effect is captured by the interaction term between the BC dummy and the Herfind-
ahl index. The interaction term has a coefficient of −0.033, which implies that the decrease in
ROA is larger for firms in less competitive industries. The coefficient is smaller than in column
[3], because the latter additionally includes the direct effect.17 Finally, the BC dummy is close
to zero and insignificant, which implies that the passage of BC laws has no significant effect on
firms in highly competitive industries.
To illustrate the magnitude of the indirect effect, note that the Herfindahl index has a
standard deviation of 0.156. Therefore, an increase in the Herfindahl index by one standard
deviation is associated with a decrease in ROA of −0.033 × 0.156 = −0.005, or 0.5 percentage
points. Alternatively, we can illustrate the indirect effect by dividing the sample into Herfindahl
quintiles. The mean value of the Herfindahl index in the lowest and highest quintile is 0.067 and
0.479, respectively. Accordingly, the passage of BC laws has virtually no effect on firms in the
lowest Herfindahl quintile: ROA drops only by 0.001−0.033×0.067 = −0.001, or 0.1 percentage
points. By contrast, in the highest Herfindahl quintile ROA drops by 0.001 − 0.033 × 0.479 =
−0.015, or 1.5 percentage points. Finally, we can compute the average effect of BC laws from
column [4] as 0.001 − 0.033 × 0.226 = −0.006, which is the same as in columns [1] and [2].
Performing an F−test shows that the BC dummy and the interaction term between the BC
dummy and the Herfindahl index are jointly significant at the 2% level.
Let us summarize our findings so far. By reducing the fear of a hostile takeover, BC laws
create more opportunity for managerial slack. And yet, we find that the passage of BC laws has
no significant effect on firms in highly competitive industries, which suggests that these industries
exhibit little tolerance, if any, for managerial slack. On the other hand, we find a significant drop
17The difference is entirely due to including the Herfindahl index as a control variable. If we run the same
regression as in column [4] but without including the Herfindahl index as a control, we find that the interaction
term has a coefficient of −0.025 (t−statistic of 4.46), which is identical to the estimate in column [3].
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in operating performance in less competitive industries, which suggests that changes in corporate
governance do matter in these industries. This has implications for corporate governance reform.
In particular, it implies that efforts to improve corporate governance could benefit from focusing
primarily on firms in less competitive industries.
Some comments are in order. First, the correlation between the Herfindahl index and the
interaction term between the BC dummy and the Herfindahl index is only 34%. Also, adding
or subtracting either of the two variables from the regression has no profound effect on the
other variable (see Table III). Hence, multicollinearity is unlikely to be an issue. Second, we can
address the potential endogeneity of the Herfinahl index. As discussed in Section 2.3, the main
issue is reverse causation. Fortunately, as Nickell (1996) points out, reverse causation predicts
the opposite sign. It predicts that the coefficient on the Herfindahl index should be negative.
However, column [4] of Table III shows that the coefficient is positive. While inconsistent with
reverse causation, this result is consistent with the conventional interpretation that an increase
in competition reduces firms’ profits.
Third, our results could be spurious if they are driven by some other (omitted) variable
that is highly correlated with the Herfindahl index. To address this issue, we have run “horse
races” between the Herfindahl index and various other variables, including size, age, leverage,
Tobin’s Q, G-index, and E-index. In each case, we have estimated our basic regression with two
additional terms: an interaction term BC ×Z and a control term Z, where Z is the variable in
question. The results were always similar to those in column [4] of Table III. In particular, the
coefficient on the BC dummy was always close to zero and insignificant, while the coefficient on
the interaction term was always highly significant with values ranging from −0.025 to −0.040.
We do not report these regressions here as many of the variables in question are endogenous,
which challenges causal interpretations.
Fourth, we can address the issue that BC laws are the outcome of lobbying by a broad
coalition of firms incorporated in the same state, which all experience a drop in performance
and operate in less competitive industries. Note that this issue is minimized here since we
can control for both local and industry shocks (see Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003)). This
accounts for the possibility that, for example, poor economic conditions in a particular state
might induce local firms to lobby for an antitakeover law in that state. Moreover, given the
evidence in Romano (1987), who portrays lobbying for antitakeover laws as an exclusive political
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process, it seems unlikely that BC laws are the outcome of broad-based lobbying.18
In column [5] of Table III we directly address the issue of broad-based lobbying by investigat-
ing the dynamic effects of BC laws. If the BC laws were passed in response to political pressure
of a broad coalition of firms incorporated in the same state, then we should see an “effect” of the
laws already prior to their passage (see Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003)). In particular, if the
coefficients on either Before(−2)×Herfindahl or Before(−1)×Herfindahl were significant,
this would be symptomatic of reverse causation. As is shown, however, neither of the two coef-
ficients is significant. Moreover, both coefficients are small, especially in comparison to those on
Before(0)×Herfindahl (the year of the passage of the BC law), After(1)×Herfindahl, and
After(2+) × Herfindahl. In sum, we find no “effect” of the BC laws prior to their passage,
which is consistent with a causal interpretation of our results.
Table IV addresses issues of measurement error. In columns [1] and [2] we replace the
(continuous) Herfindahl index with dummies indicating whether the Herfindahl index is above
or below the median. We drop the BC dummy and one of the Herfindahl dummies to avoid
perfect multicollinearity. The results are similar to Table III. Whether or not we include control
variables, the passage of BC laws has no effect on firms in competitive industries (Herfindahl
below the median). By contrast, firms in less competitive industries experience a significant
drop in ROA between 1.0 and 1.1 percentage points. The average effect of the BC laws can be
computed as −0.003 × 0.5 − 0.010 × 0.5 = −0.007 and −0.002 × 0.5 − 0.011 × 0.5 = −0.007,
respectively, which is similar to Table III.
In columns [3] and [4] we repeat the exercise with three Herfindahl dummies. The results
are again similar. While the passage of BC laws has no significant effect on firms in competitive
industries, firms in less competitive industries (medium and top Herfindahl tercile) experience a
significant drop in ROA. While monotonic, the relationship is not perfectly linear. The difference
in ROA between the lowest and medium Herfindahl tercile is more than twice the difference
between the medium and top tercile. We can again compute the average effect of the BC laws as
−0.000×0.35−0.008×0.3−0.011×0.35 = −0.006 and 0.002×0.35−0.008×0.3−0.012×0.35 =
−0.006, respectively, which is similar to Table III.
Table V continues with issues of measurement error. This time, we consider alternative
18This is confirmed by newspaper reports (cf., Section 4). In many cases, the BC law was motivated by a
single firm facing a hostile takeover attempt. Excluding such motivating firms does not affect our results.
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Herfindahl indices. Our basic measure of competition is the Herfindahl index based on 3-digit
SIC codes. The 3-digit partition is a compromise between the coarse 2-digit partition, in which
unrelated industries may be pooled together, and the narrow 4-digit partition, which may be
subject to misclassification. In columns [1] and [2] we examine if our results also hold for 2- and
4-digit SIC Herfindahl indices. They do. The only major difference compared to Table III is
that the coefficient on the 2-digit Herfindahl index as a control is not significant, which likely
is due to lack of sufficient “within” variation.19 In columns [3] to [5] we use 2-, 3-, and 4-digit
SIC Herfindahl indices based on firms’ assets in place of sales (see Hou and Robinson (2006)).
The idea is that sales are relatively volatile, with the effect that changes in the Herfindahl index
based on sales may overstate actual changes in industry concentration.20 As is shown, it makes
little difference if we use Herfindahl indices based on sales or assets.
In column [1] of Table VI we exclude Delaware firms from the treatment group. Given that
half of the firms in our sample are incorporated in Delaware (see Table I), one might be worried
that our results are driven by a single law. As is shown, the coefficients on both the BC dummy
and the interaction term between the BC dummy and the Herfindahl index are very similar to
column [4] of Table III. While consistent with previous findings by Bertrand and Mullainathan
(2003, Table 10), this result contrasts with the often-heard argument that the Delaware BC
law was less stringent than other BC laws.21 In column [2] we exclude firms incorporated in
states that did not pass a BC law during the sample period (“Never Business Combination”).
19While the interaction terms in columns [1] and [2] of Table V and column [4] of Table III have different
coefficients, the average effect of the BC laws is the same in all three cases. The mean values of the 2- and 4-digit
SIC Herfindahl indices are 0.103 and 0.274, respectively. Thus, we can compute the average effect from columns
[1] and [2] of Table V as −0.000− 0.056×0.103 = −0.006 and 0.000−0.022× 0.274 = −0.006, respectively, which
is the same as in column [4] of Table III. We can also compute the magnitude of the indirect effect. The standard
deviations of the 2- and 4-digit SIC Herfindahl indices are 0.075 and 0.190, respectively. Thus, an increase in the
Herfindahl index by one standard deviation is associated with a drop in ROA of −0.056 × 0.075 = −0.004 and
−0.022× 0.190 = −0.004, respectively.
20An alternative is to use smoothed industry concentration measures. If we run our basic regression using a
3-year moving average Herfindahl index, we find that the interaction term has a coefficient of −0.029 (t−statistic
of 3.94), which is similar to estimate in column [4] of Table III. The coefficient on the BC dummy is again close
to zero and insignificant.
21That the t−statistic on the interaction term is smaller than in Table III is likely due to the smaller sample
size. In column [1] we lose about 58% percent of our treatment group, which significantly reduces the number of
observations available for identifying the coefficient on the interaction term.
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As discussed in Section 2.2, firms incorporated in non-passing states are smaller and slightly
younger on average, feeding concerns that the control group might not be an appropriate one.
As is shown, it makes little difference if we exclude those firms.
We have remarked earlier that the positive coefficient on the Herfindahl index as a control
variable is inconsistent with reverse causation. Another way to address the issue of reverse
causation, which we explore in Table VII, is to use past values of the Herfindahl index. In
columns [1] and [2] we use 1- and 2-year lagged Herfindahl indices, respectively. The results
are similar to column [4] of Table III.22 In column [3] we use the average Herfindahl index from
1976 to 1984 to specifically address concerns that the drop in profitability caused by the passage
of BC laws might feed back into the Herfindahl index. (The first BC law was passed in 1985).
The results are again similar to column [4] of Table III. Note the missing coefficient on the
Herfindahl index as a control variable. Since the average Herfindahl index from 1976 to 1984
has no “within” variation, the coefficient is not identified.
Table VIII considers alternative performance measures. Column [1] considers ROA after
depreciation, which is defined as operating income after depreciation and amortization (EBIT,
item #178) divided by total assets (item #6). The correlation between ROA before and after
depreciation is 97%. Hence, it does not surprise that the results are similar to Table III. In
columns [2] and [3] we consider return on sales (ROS), which is defined as operating income
before depreciation and amortization (EBITDA, item #13) divided by sales (item #12), and
return on equity (ROE), which is defined as net income (item #172) divided by common equity
(item #60). While the results are again similar, they are somewhat weaker. In particular, the
interaction term has a smaller t−statistic than in column [4] of Table III. That the results are
weaker does not surprise. Compared to ROA, ROS and, especially, ROE, are arguably less
well-suited as measures of operating performance.23
3.2 Manufacturing Industries
In Table IX we focus exclusively on manufacturing industries (SIC 2000-3999). For these
industries only, the U.S. Bureau of the Census provides a Herfindahl index that includes both
public and private firms. While the Census Herfindahl index is somewhat broader, it entails
22The results are also similar if we use 3-, 4-, and 5-year lagged Herfindahl indices.
23The correlation between ROA and ROE (ROS) is 61% (53%).
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some serious limitations. First, and perhaps most important, the index is only available for
the years 1982, 1987, and 1992 during our sample period. To fill in the missing years, we
always use the index from the latest available year. For the years prior to 1982, we use the
value from 1982. Second, the index is only available on the narrow 4-digit SIC code level,
which implies that it is likely subject to misclassification (see Section 2.2). Third, the index is
only available for manufacturing industries, which implies that we lose more than half of our
observations. Fourth, there is no match for COMPUSTAT firms whose 4-digit SIC code ends
with a “zero”, which implies that we lose additional observations.24 In conjunction with missing
values (e.g., non-disclosure of information by the Census Bureau), this leaves us with 19, 244
firm-year observations. Finally, albeit only a minor quibble, the Census Herfindahl index is a
truncated measure that includes only the top 50 firms in each industry.
In column [1] we estimate our basic specification for manufacturing industries only using the
3-digit SIC Herfindahl index computed from COMPUSTAT. The results are similar to column
[4] of Table III, except that the interaction term between the BC dummy and the Herfindahl
index has a smaller t−statistic. This is likely due to two reasons. First, as discussed above,
the manufacturing sample is much smaller. Second, there is less cross-sectional variation in the
Herfindahl index among manufacturing industries, which makes it more difficult to identify the
coefficient on the interaction term.
In column [2] we run the same regression, except that we use the Census Herfindahl index.25
The results are again similar to column [4] of Table III, except that the interaction term has
a larger coefficient and a smaller t−statistic. The smaller t−statistic is likely due to the same
reasons as above. The larger coefficient matters only insofar as it implies different economic
magnitudes. However, the magnitudes are similar to Table III: The Census Herfindahl index
has a mean value of 0.058 and a standard deviation of 0.046. We can thus compute the average
effect as −0.003− 0.081× 0.058 = −0.008, which implies that ROA decreases by 0.8 percentage
24 In COMPUSTAT, 4-digit industries ending with a “zero” are effectively 3-digit industries. In some cases,
COMPUSTAT also assigns 4-digit SIC codes ending with a “zero” if the firm operates in more than one 4-digit
industry.
25The Herfindahl index as a control variable is omitted in column [2]. Except for two “jumps” in 1982 and
1987, the Census Herfindahl index is a constant, which implies that the coefficient is not well identified. By
contrast, the 3-digit SIC Herfindahl index computed from COMPUSTAT, while it has a substantial degree of
serial correlation, has sufficient “within” variation to allow the coefficient to be well identified. (The same is not
necessarily true of the 2-digit SIC Herfindahl index; see Table V).
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points. Likewise, we can compute the indirect effect as −0.081× 0.046 = −0.004, which implies
that an increase in the Census Herfindahl index by one standard deviation is associated with a
drop in ROA of 0.4 percentage points.
Whether we use the Herfindahl index computed from COMPUSTAT or that provided by the
Census Bureau, we only capture domestic product market competition. To measure competi-
tion from foreign companies, we use data on import penetration (imports divided by the sum
of domestic shipments plus imports minus exports). The data is from Peter Schott’s website
and is described in Feenstra (1996) and Feenstra, Romalis, and Schott (2002). Using import
penetration as a measure of competition has some serious limitations. First, the data is only
available on the narrow 4-digit SIC code level, which implies that it is likely subject to misclas-
sification. Second, we again lose a large number of observations. The reasons are the same as
above, except that there are fewer missing values, which implies that we have a slightly bigger
sample. Third, and most important, it is not obvious that import penetration is a suitable
measure of competition. For example, import penetration may be high, yet an industry may
be highly non-competitive because all imports come from a few, perhaps only one, foreign pro-
ducers. Likewise, import penetration may be low, yet an industry may be highly competitive
because domestic product market competition is fierce. In fact, import penetration may be low
because domestic competition is fierce.
In column [3] we estimate our basic specification using import penetration in place of the
Herfindahl index. To ensure that the BC dummy has the same interpretation as before, we
use one minus import penetration as our measure of competition. The results are qualitatively
similar to those in column [4] of Table III, except that the coefficient on the interaction term
between the BC dummy and the Herfindahl index is not significant. This is likely due to two
reasons. First, as discussed above, the manufacturing sample is much smaller. Recall that
already in columns [1] and [2] the interaction term had a relatively small t−statistic (compared
to the t−statistics in previous tables). Second, and most likely the relevant explanation, import
penetration may be simply a poor measure of competition. As we have pointed out above, there
need be no relation between import penetration and the competitiveness of an industry. Not
surprisingly, it turns out that the correlation between import penetration and the Herfindahl
index is extremely small (−0.37% for the 3-digit SIC Herfindahl index).
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3.3 Cross-Sectional and Serial Correlation
In all our regressions, we have clustered standard errors at the state of incorporation level to
account for the presence of cross-sectional and serial correlation of the error terms. Cross-
sectional correlation is a concern because all firms in a given year and state of incorporation are
affected by the same “shock” (namely, the passage of a BC law). Serial correlation is a concern
because the BC dummy changes little over time, being zero before and one after the passage
of a BC law. Not correcting for either problem can lead to a serious understatement of the
standard errors. Simulation-based studies that compare different correction methods show that
clustering performs well (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004), Petersen (2007)). This is
especially true if the number of clusters is large, as is the case here (51 clusters). Given that
the BC dummy is a likely source of both cross-sectional and serial correlation, it seems natural
to cluster at the state of incorporation level. This allows for arbitrary correlations of the error
terms within each state of incorporation, both cross-sectionally and across time. However, we
have verified that our results also hold if we cluster at the state of location level.
Table X considers alternative methods to account for the presence of cross-sectional and
serial correlation. The methods are described in Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004),
which is why we shall be brief. Columns [1] to [3] deal with serial correlation; column [4] deals
with cross-sectional correlation.
The first correction method is a parametric one. We assume that the error term follows an
AR(1) process and estimate the first-order autocorrelation coefficient by regressing the residuals
from our basic regression in column [4] of Table III on their lagged values. We then form an
estimate of the covariance matrix of the residuals and estimate our basic specification using
GLS. As is shown in column [1], the results are similar to column [4] of Table III. In particular,
the coefficient on the BC dummy is close to zero and insignificant, while the coefficient on the
interaction term is highly significant with a value similar to column [4] of Table III. While this
is good news, it should be noted that parametric correction methods perform rather poorly in
simulations (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004)). The remaining methods in Table X
are all non-parametric.
The second method is block bootstrapping. According to Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan
(2004), this method constitutes a reliable solution to the serial correlation problem if the number
of blocks is sufficiently large, which is the case here (51 blocks). We construct a large number
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(200) of bootstrap samples by drawing with replacement 51 states of incorporation from our
sample. For each bootstrap sample, we estimate our basic specification using OLS and compute
for each covariate the absolute t−statistic tr := abs[(βˆr − βˆ)/SE(βˆr)], where βˆ is the estimated
coefficient from column [4] of Table III, and where βˆr is the estimated coefficient from the
rth bootstrap. We compute p−values as the relative frequency that tr is larger than t, where
t := abs[βˆ/SE(βˆ)] is the absolute t−statistic from the OLS estimation of the specification in
column [4] of Table III. Since the p−values refer to the significance of the original coefficients
in Table III, we again report those coefficients. We reject the null of a zero coefficient at the 95
percent confidence level if 95 percent of the tr values are smaller than t. As is shown in column
[2], the results are again similar to column [4] of Table III.26
The third method is to collapse the data into two periods, before and after the BC law,
and run an OLS regression on this two-period panel. Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004)
show that this method performs well in simulations. Of course, the method is rather crude–by
collapsing 20 years of data into two periods, we lose many observations–which reduces the
power of our tests. What is more, due to the staggering of the BC laws over time, “before”
and “after” are not the same for each treatment state. And for control states, “before” and
“after” are not even defined. We address this issue using the two-step procedure proposed by
Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004). In the first step, we regress ROA on fixed effects
and covariates, except for the BC dummy and the interaction term between the BC dummy
and the Herfindahl index. For treatment states only, we then collect the residuals and compute
the average residuals for the pre- and post-BC law periods. This provides us with a two-period
panel, where the first period is before the BC law and the second period is after the law. In
the second step, we regress the average residuals on the BC dummy and the interaction term
between the BC dummy and the average Herfindahl index during the post-BC law period. We
use White standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity. As column [3] shows, the results are
similar to column [4] of Table III.27 While the coefficient on the BC dummy is close to zero and
26We can also compute the mean and median values of each coefficient based on the 200 bootstraps. The
values are very close to those in column [4] of Table III. For example, the mean coefficient on the BC dummy
is 0.002, while the mean coefficient on the interaction term between the BC dummy and the Herfindahl index is
−0.033. The median values are virtually identical.
27Columns [3] and [4] only display the second-stage regressions. The results of the first-stage regressions are
available upon request. Note that the dependent variable in columns [3] and [4] is not ROA but the average
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insignificant, the coefficient on the interaction term between the BC dummy and the Herfindahl
index is negative and significant.
The fourth correction method, which deals with cross-sectional correlation, is to collapse the
data into state of incorporation-industry-year cells.28 The basic idea is that our variables of
interest, the BC dummy and the Herfindahl index, are on a higher level of aggregation, namely,
the state of incorporation and industry level, respectively. The drawback of this method is that
we again lose many observations, which reduces the power of our tests. Similar to the method
in column [3], we again proceed in two steps. In the first step, we regress ROA on time dummies
and covariates, except for the BC dummy and the interaction term between the BC dummy and
the Herfindahl index. We then collect the residuals and compute the average residual for each
state of incorporation-industry-year portfolio. In the second step, we regress average residuals
on portfolio fixed effects, the BC dummy, and the interaction term between the BC dummy and
the Herfindahl index. We use White standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity. As column
[4] shows, the results are similar to column [4] of Table III. The coefficient on the BC dummy is
again close to zero and insignificant, while the coefficient on the interaction term between the
BC dummy and the Herfindahl index is negative and significant.
3.4 Empire Building or Quiet Life?
By reducing the threat of a hostile takeover, BC laws create more opportunity for managerial
slack. And yet, we have seen that the passage of BC laws has no significant effect on firms in
competitive industries. While this suggests that product market competition mitigates manage-
rial agency problems, it does not address which agency problem is mitigated. Does competition
curb managerial empire building? Or does it prevent managers from enjoying a “quiet life,” as
suggested by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003)? To investigate the first possibility, we esti-
mate our basic specification using capital expenditures (COMPUSTAT item #30) divided by
total assets (item #6) as the dependent variable. To investigate the second possibility, we use a
number of dependent variables: selling, general, and administrative expenses (“overhead costs”,
item #189) and R&D expenses (item #46), both divided by total assets, advertising expenses
residual from the respective first-stage regressions. The coefficients are thus not directly comparable to those in
column [4] of Table III.
28This method is described in footnote 14 of Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004). It is essentially the
same method as in column [3], except that it is applied to the cross-section rather than the time-series.
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(item #45) and costs of goods sold (“input costs”, item #41), both divided by sales (item #12),
and real wages, defined as the natural logarithm of labor and related expenses (item #42) di-
vided by the number of employees (item #29) and deflated by the Consumer Price Index (CPI).
The idea is that, in order to keep the firm’s costs low, managers must haggle with labor unions
and input suppliers and resist pressure from individual units within the organization demanding
bigger overhead, advertising, and R&D budgets.
The results are shown in Table XI. Column [1] considers the effect of BC laws on capital
expenditures. As it turns out, there is no effect. Neither the BC dummy nor the interaction
term between the BC dummy and the Herfindahl index is significant, neither individually nor
jointly.29 While inconsistent with empire building, this is consistent with previous findings by
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), who also find that BC laws have no significant effect on
(plant-level) capital expenditures. The remaining results in Table XI are mixed. Columns [3]
and [4] consider the effect of BC laws on advertising and R&D expenses, respectively. While
the relevant coefficients all have the right signs, they are not significant.
Columns [2], [5], and [6] show the effect of BC laws on selling, general, and administrative
expenses, costs of goods sold, and real wages, respectively. In all three columns, the pattern is
similar to our previous ROA regressions. While the coefficient on the BC dummy is close to
zero and insignificant, the coefficient on the interaction term between the BC dummy and the
Herfindahl index is positive and significant. (The sign of the coefficient is the opposite as in our
ROA regressions, because the dependent variables are negatively related to ROA). Hence, while
BC laws have no significant effect on firms in competitive industries, they cause a significant
increase in overhead costs, input costs, and wages in less competitive industries. These results
are consistent with a “quiet-life” hypothesis whereby managers insulated from both takeover
pressure and competitive pressure seek to avoid cognitively difficult activities, such as haggling
with input suppliers, labor unions, and individual units within the organization demanding
bigger overhead budgets.
We conclude with two caveats. First, the t−statistics in columns [2], [5], and [6] are smaller
than in our previous ROA regressions, presumably because the dependent variables are all
individual components of ROA. That is, while BC laws may have a relatively small effect on any
29The F−test that the two variables are jointly significant has a p−value of 0.82. Another way to test whether
BC laws have a significant effect on capital expenditures is to run the same regression as in column [1] but without
the interaction term. In that regression, the BC dummy has a coefficient of −0.000 (t−statistic of −0.24).
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individual component of ROA, the overall effect on ROA may be substantial. Second, the wage
result in column [6] should be taken with caution. For one thing, the sample is relatively small,
which is due to the fact that only few firms in COMPUSTAT report wage data. More important,
however, the COMPUSTAT wage data is quite noisy.30 For example, some firms report wage
data only intermittently, while others report no data at all. What is more, COMPUSTAT
only provides aggregate data on labor and related expenses, which also includes pension costs,
payroll taxes, and employee benefits, to name just a few. On a positive note, our wage results
are consistent with those by Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999, 2003), who report wage increases
between 1% and 2% after the passage of BC laws. In our case, we can compute the average
wage increase after the passage of BC laws from column [6] as −0.003 + 0.103× 0.218 = 0.019,
or 1.9%, which is roughly of the same order of magnitude.31
4 Event-Study Results
Does the stock market anticipate that firms in competitive industries will be largely unaffected
by the passage of BC laws, whereas firms in less competitive industries will likely experience a
drop in performance? The main difficulty in answering this question lies in the choice of event
date. Since the passage of BC laws is presumably well anticipated, the passage date is unlikely
to contain much new information. Rather, one needs to find an early date at which significant
news about the law was disseminated to the public, e.g., the date of the first newspaper report.
For instance, take the event study by Karpoff and Malatesta (1989), who examine the stock
price impact of 40 antitakeover laws, including 11 BC laws, from 1982 to 1987.32 The authors
find no significant abnormal returns when using either the date of the law’s introduction in the
state legislature, its final passage, or its signing by the governor as the event date. However,
they do find significant abnormal returns when using the first date on which they could find a
newspaper report as the event date.
Finding the first newspaper report about a BC law is often a formidable task. Electronic
archives of local newspapers often do not go back to the 1980s, and larger out-of-state newspa-
30See Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999) for a discussion of the COMPUSTAT wage data.
31The Herfindahl index in column [6] has a mean value of 0.218, which is slightly different from the mean value
of 0.226 in our previous ROA regressions because of differences in sample size.
32Most other event studies focus on a single antitakeover law; see Table 2 in Bhagat and Romano (2002).
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pers, like the Wall Street Journal or New York Times, often provide no coverage, especially if
the state is small and only few firms are incorporated there. Indeed, after a careful search of all
major newpaper databases (ProQuest, Lexis-Nexis, Factiva, Newsbank America’s Newspapers,
Google News Archive), we could only find newspaper reports for 19 of the 30 BC laws in our
sample: Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.33 Most of the 11 states for which we could not find a
newspaper report are small in terms of number of incorporated firms. In fact, seven of them
have fewer than 20 firms–and only one has more than 100 firms (Nevada, 122 firms)–in the
merged CRSP-COMPUSTAT sample in the year the BC law was passed. Based on the numbers
in Table I, the 19 states for which we could find newspaper reports represent 92% of all firms
incorporated in states that passed a BC law during the sample period.
The event-study methodology is based on the assumption that the events are independent
(MacKinlay (1997, p. 27)). While this assumption is satisfied in many applications where the
event is firm-specific, such as earnings or dividend announcements, it is violated in our setting.
Since all firms incorporated in the same state are affected by the same event, their abnormal
returns will likely be correlated. As a result, standard errors will be biased, leading to incorrect
inferences (see Bernard (1987)). The common way to address this problem in event studies is
to form portfolios consisting of all firms incorporated in a given state. Since the event dates
are different for each portfolio, the issue of cross-sectional correlation does not arise, or at least
becomes negligible (Karpoff and Malatesta (1989), MacKinlay (1997)).
33The dates of the newspaper reports are as follows: Arizona on July 27, 1987 (Arizona Business Gazette);
Connecticut on February 7, 1988 (New Haven Register); Delaware on June 1, 1987 (New York Times, see also
Jahera and Pugh (1991, p. 415)); Georgia on April 23, 1987 (The Atlanta Journal-Constitution); Illinois on
November 30, 1988 (Chicago Sun-Times); Kentucky on March 28, 1986 (Lexington Herald-Leader); Maryland on
February 5, 1988 (Washington Post); Massachusetts on February 5, 1989 (Boston Globe); Minnesota on June
19, 1987 (Star Tribune); New Jersey on March 25, 1986 (The Record); New York on June 26, 1985 (New York
Times, see also Schuman (1988, p. 563)); Ohio on April 6, 1990 (Dayton Daily News); Oklahoma on March
7, 1991 (The Journal Record); Pennsylvania on February 17, 1988 (Philadelphia Inquirer); South Carolina on
April 17, 1988 (The State); Tennessee on January 25, 1988 (Memphis Business Journal); Virginia on February 8,
1988 (Richmond Times-Dispatch); Washington on July 29, 1987 (Seattle Times, see also Karpoff and Malatesta
(1989, p. 315)); Wisconsin on September 10, 1987 (Star Tribune). If the newspaper report was published on a
non-trading day, we specify the next trading day as the event date.
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Our empirical methodology is similar to Karpoff and Malatesta (1989). For each state
portfolio j, we estimate the market model using CRSP daily return data from 241 to 41 trading
days prior to the event date.34 Precisely, using OLS we estimate the parameters αj and βj of
the equation
Rjt = αj + βjRmt + ejt, (2)
where Rjt is the daily return of the equally-weighted portfolio of firms incorporated in state j,
and Rmt is the daily return of the equally-weighted CRSP market portfolio. Substituting the
estimates back into (2), we obtain an estimate of the normal portfolio return Rˆjt. The abnormal
return of state portfolio j can then be calculated as
ARjt := Rjt − Rˆjt.
To obtain cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), we simply sum the abnormal returns over the
desired time interval. We report CARs for the same time intervals as Karpoff and Malatesta
(1989): [-40,-2], [-3,-2], [-1,0], [1,2], and [1,10], where [-1,0] is the two-day event window. To see
if there had already been some trend in the weeks prior to the event date, we additionally report
CARs for the time intervals [-30,-2], [-20,-2], and [-10,-2].
The methodology described above yields an estimate of the average impact of BC laws on
stock prices. To examine if the price impact is different for firms in competitive and non-
competitive industries, we subdivide each state portfolio into smaller portfolios. Precisely, for
each state j, we form low- and high-Herfindahl portfolios consisting of all firms whose Herfindahl
index lies below and above the median, respectively. We do the same with low-, medium-, and
high-Herfindahl portfolios. The remaining steps are as above.
In column [1] of Table XII we report average CARs based on the 19 state portfolios. The
average CAR for the two-day event window is −0.32% with a z−statistic of −2.58, which has
a p−value of 0.010. Furthermore, 14 of the 19 average two-day CARs are negative. While our
number is somewhat smaller than the average two-day CAR of −0.47% reported by Karpoff and
34Choosing the estimation window adjacent to the first time interval for which cumulative abnormal returns
are computed (here: the interval [-40,-2]) is standard practice (e.g., MacKinlay (1997, p. 19)). However, we obtain
similar results if we estimate the market model over the interval from 300 to 100 trading days before the event
date. The market model is the most common statistical model to calculate normal returns at daily frequency.
However, we also obtain similar results if we use either the Fama-French (1993) 3-factor model or Carhart’s (1997)
4-factor model.
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Malatesta (1989, Panel (A) of Table 5), it is roughly of the same order of magnitude.35 More-
over, the average two-day CARs immediately before and after the event window are small and
insignificant. This indicates that, on average, newspaper reports about BC laws are associated
with a significant decrease in stockholder wealth.
In columns [2] and [3] we report average CARs for low- and high-Herfindahl portfolios con-
sisting of firms whose Herfindahl index lies below and above the median, respectively. For the
low-Herfindahl portfolio, the average CAR for the two-day event window is close to zero and
insignificant. By contrast, for the high-Herfindahl portfolio, the average CAR for the two-day
event window is −0.54% with a z−statistic of −2.36, which has a p−value of 0.018. Thus, while
firms in competitive industries experience no significant stock price impact around the first
newspaper report, firms in less competitive industries experience a significant abnormal decline
in their stock prices. Overall, this suggest that the stock market anticipates that BC laws have
a negative impact only on firms in less competitive industries.
In columns [4] to [6] we report average CARs for low-, medium-, and high-Herfindahl port-
folios consisting of firms whose Herfindahl index lies in the bottom, medium, and top tercile,
respectively. The results are again similar. While firms in competitive industries experience
no significant stock price impact, firms in less competitive industries (medium and top terciles)
experience a significant abnormal decline in their stock prices. Interestingly, and consistent
with Table IV, the relationship between the CARs and the Herfindahl index is monotonic. For
the medium-tercile portfolio, the average CAR for the two-day event window is −0.44% with a
z−statistic of −1.67, which has a p−value of 0.095. By contrast, for the top-tercile portfolio, the
average CAR for the two-day event window is −0.67% with a z−statistic of −2.31, which has
a p−value of 0.021.36 Not only do these results confirm that the stock market anticipates that
BC laws have a negative impact only on firms in non-competitive industries, they also suggest
that the market knows that high-Herfindahl firms fare worse than medium-Herfindahl firms.
35That our number is smaller is likely due to differences in samples: We have 19 BC laws while Karpoff and
Malatesta (1989) have 11 BC laws. Moreover, among the 11 BC laws is California, even though the legislation
there never became law. For this reason, California is not included in our sample.
36For the low-tercile portfolio, the average CAR for the two-day event window is 0.08% with a z−statistic of
−0.53.We obtain a similar monotonic pattern using median CARs. The median CARs for the bottom-, medium-,
and high-tercile portfolios are 0.06%, −0.46%, and −0.67%, respectively. The corresponding ratios of positive to
negative CARs for the two-day event window are 10:9, 4:15, and 5:14, respectively.
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5 Conclusion
Does competition mitigate managerial agency problems? And is there merit to the considerably
stronger view expressed by Alchian (1950), Friedman (1953), and Stigler (1958) that managerial
slack cannot exist, or survive, in competitive industries? The evidence from our study suggests
that the answer to both questions is yes. Using the passage of 30 business combination (BC)
laws as a source of identifying variation, we examine if such laws have a different impact on
firms in competitive and non-competitive industries. Consistent with the notion that BC laws
weaken corporate governance and create more opportunity for managerial slack (see Bertrand
and Mullainathan (2003)), we find that, on average, firms’ operating performance drops signif-
icantly after the passage of BC laws. Most important, we find that this result is exclusively
driven by firms in non-competitive industries. By contrast, firms in competitive industries re-
main virtually unaffected, which is supportive of the Alchian-Friedman-Stigler hypothesis that
competitive industries leave no room for managerial slack.
The insight that (variation in) corporate governance has little or no effect on firms in com-
petitive industries, if true, has far-reaching implications. For one thing, it implies that efforts to
improve corporate governance could benefit from focusing primarily on firms in non-competitive
industries. For another, it implies that empirical studies on corporate governance could benefit
from including measures of industry competition. Results might be stronger, both economi-
cally and statistically, for firms operating in non-competitive industries. For instance, prelim-
inary research by the authors suggests that the positive alphas generated by the democracy-
dictatorship hedge portfolios in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (GIM, 2003) are driven by firms in
non-competitive industries (Giroud and Mueller (2007)). In fact, if we split the annual samples
into low-, medium- and high-Herfindahl samples, we find that the alphas in the low-Herfindahl
samples are small and insignificant, whereas those in the high-Herfindahl samples are large and
highly significant. Naturally, since the alphas in GIM are averages across all three samples, this
implies that the alphas in the high-Herfindahl samples are higher than those in GIM. Not only
are these results robust across different measures of industry competition, they also extend to
other governance indices, such as the E-index by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2005). A similar,
albeit weaker, picture emerges with respect to the Q-regressions reported in GIM. While these
preliminary findings are encouraging, more research is needed before we can firmly conclude
that firm-level corporate governance instruments are moot in competitive industries.
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Table I 
States of Incorporation and States of Location 
 
“BC year” indicates the year in which a business combination (BC) law was passed. “State of location” indicates the 
state in which a firm’s headquarters are located. BC years are from Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003). States of location 
and states of incorporation are both from COMPUSTAT. The sample period is from 1976 to 1995. 
 
 
Delaware 1988 5,587 39 35 (89.7%) 4 (10.3%)
California 529 1,711 489 (28.6%) 1,034 (60.4%) 188 (11.0%)
New York 1985 515 1,129 366 (32.4%) 673 (59.6%) 90 (8.0%)
Nevada 1991 302 97 55 (56.7%) 28 (28.9%) 14 (14.4%)
Florida 290 584 240 (41.1%) 261 (44.7%) 83 (14.2%)
Minnesota 1987 287 342 243 (71.1%) 88 (25.7%) 11 (3.2%)
Massachusetts 1989 280 527 236 (44.8%) 253 (48.0%) 38 (7.2%)
Colorado 266 363 160 (44.1%) 147 (40.5%) 56 (15.4%)
Pennsylvania 1989 264 428 219 (51.2%) 169 (39.5%) 40 (9.3%)
Texas 263 951 240 (25.2%) 555 (58.4%) 156 (16.4%)
New Jersey 1986 255 585 194 (33.2%) 305 (52.1%) 86 (14.7%)
Ohio 1990 224 375 198 (52.8%) 151 (40.3%) 26 (6.9%)
Maryland 1989 197 200 82 (41.0%) 103 (51.5%) 15 (7.5%)
Georgia 1988 142 277 123 (44.4%) 121 (43.7%) 33 (11.9%)
Virginia 1988 137 243 106 (43.6%) 103 (42.4%) 34 (14.0%)
Michigan 1989 120 209 109 (52.2%) 81 (38.8%) 19 (9.1%)
Indiana 1986 119 144 97 (67.4%) 41 (28.5%) 6 (4.2%)
Utah 111 97 60 (61.9%) 29 (29.9%) 8 (8.2%)
Washington 1987 102 149 87 (58.4%) 44 (29.5%) 18 (12.1%)
Wisconsin 1987 94 124 86 (69.4%) 34 (27.4%) 4 (3.2%)
North Carolina 92 173 85 (49.1%) 66 (38.2%) 22 (12.7%)
Missouri 1986 80 169 60 (35.5%) 92 (54.4%) 17 (10.1%)
Oregon 69 89 61 (68.5%) 15 (16.9%) 13 (14.6%)
Tennessee 1988 67 134 59 (44.0%) 54 (40.3%) 21 (15.7%)
Oklahoma 1991 58 121 45 (37.2%) 58 (47.9%) 18 (14.9%)
Illinois 1989 57 444 47 (10.6%) 353 (79.5%) 44 (9.9%)
Connecticut 1989 56 307 48 (15.6%) 209 (68.1%) 50 (16.3%)
Arizona 1987 39 152 35 (23.0%) 76 (50.0%) 41 (27.0%)
Iowa 38 67 31 (46.3%) 27 (40.3%) 9 (13.4%)
Louisiana 35 67 30 (44.8%) 30 (44.8%) 7 (10.4%)
South Carolina 1988 35 77 34 (44.2%) 37 (48.1%) 6 (7.8%)
Kansas 1989 34 70 26 (37.1%) 33 (47.1%) 11 (15.7%)
Kentucky 1987 29 67 28 (41.8%) 31 (46.3%) 8 (11.9%)
Rhode Island 1990 18 37 14 (37.8%) 18 (48.6%) 5 (13.5%)
Wyoming 1989 18 13 7 (53.8%) 1 (7.7%) 5 (38.5%)
Mississippi 16 47 15 (31.9%) 21 (44.7%) 11 (23.4%)
New Mexico 15 26 9 (34.6%) 10 (38.5%) 7 (26.9%)
Maine 1988 13 14 5 (35.7%) 8 (57.1%) 1 (7.1%)
New Hampshire 13 47 11 (23.4%) 28 (59.6%) 8 (17.0%)
Hawaii 12 20 8 (40.0%) 9 (45.0%) 3 (15.0%)
Alabama 10 67 9 (13.4%) 54 (80.6%) 4 (6.0%)
District of Columbia 10 30 4 (13.3%) 22 (73.3%) 4 (13.3%)
Idaho 1988 10 16 2 (12.5%) 11 (68.8%) 3 (18.8%)
Arkansas 9 35 9 (25.7%) 20 (57.1%) 6 (17.1%)
Nebraska 1988 9 29 8 (27.6%) 18 (62.1%) 3 (10.3%)
West Virginia 8 19 7 (36.8%) 9 (47.4%) 3 (15.8%)
Montana 7 13 7 (53.8%) 4 (30.8%) 2 (15.4%)
Vermont 7 16 6 (37.5%) 9 (56.3%) 1 (6.3%)
Alaska 6 6 4 (66.7%) 2 (33.3%) 0 (0.0%)
South Dakota 1990 4 10 4 (40.0%) 5 (50.0%) 1 (10.0%)
North Dakota 2 4 1 (25.0%) 2 (50.0%) 1 (25.0%)
Total 10,960 10,960 4,144 (37.8%) 5,552 (50.7%) 1,264 (11.5%)
State of    
Location
Number of    
Firms
Number (Percentage) of Firms Incorporated in:
State BC Year
State of Location Delaware Other States
State of 
Incorporation
Number of  
Firms
 
Table II 
Summary Statistics 
  
“All States” refers to all states in Table I. “Eventually Business Combination” refers to all states that passed a BC law 
during the sample period. “Never Business Combination” refers to all states that did not pass a BC law during the sam-
ple period. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets (COMPUSTAT item #6). Age is the natural logarithm of one plus 
the number of years the firm has been in COMPUSTAT. Leverage is long-term debt (item #9) plus debt in current li-
abilities (item #34) divided by total assets. Herfindahl is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, which is computed as the 
sum of squared market shares of all firms in a given 3-digit SIC industry. Market shares are computed from 
COMPUSTAT using sales (item #12). E-Index is the entrenchment index by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2005) and is 
obtained from Lucian Bebchuk’s webpage. G-index is the governance index by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and 
is obtained from the IRRC database. Both indices are available for the years 1990, 1993 and 1995 during the sample 
period. All figures are sample means. Standard deviations are in parentheses. The sample period is from 1976 to 1995. 
 
 
All States Eventually Business Combination
Never Business 
Combination
[1] [2] [3]
Size 4.450 4.585 3.629
(2.283) (2.270) (2.185)
Age 2.252 2.293 2.002
(0.918) (0.924) (0.837)
Leverage 0.263 0.264 0.256
(0.391) (0.388) (0.407)
Herfindahl 0.225 0.226 0.214
(0.155) (0.156) (0.148)
E-Index 2.304 2.319 2.127
(1.381) (1.371) (1.479)
G-Index 9.342 9.498 7.450
(2.883) (2.828) (2.869)
 
 
 
Table III 
Does Corporate Governance Matter in Competitive Industries? 
 
Return on assets is operating income before depreciation and amortization (COMPUSTAT item #13) divided by total 
assets (item #6). BC is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is incorporated in a state that passed a BC law dur-
ing the sample period. Before(-2) and Before(-1) are dummy variables that equal one if the firm is incorporated in a 
state that will pass a BC law in two years and one year from now, respectively. Before(0) is a dummy variable that 
equals one if the firm is incorporated in a state that passes a BC law this year. After(1) and  After(2+) are dummy vari-
ables that equal one if the firm is incorporated in a state that passed a BC law one year and two or more years ago, re-
spectively. “State-year” and “industry-year” refers to the mean of the dependent variable in the firm’s state of location 
and industry, respectively, in that year, excluding the firm itself. All other variables are defined in Table II. Standard 
errors are clustered at the state of incorporation level. The sample period is from 1976 to 1995. t-statistics are in paren-
theses. *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
BC -0.006** -0.006** -0.001 0.001 0.001
(2.41) (2.25) (0.32) (0.35) (0.13)
BC x Herfindahl -0.025*** -0.033***
(4.93) (4.95)
Industry-year 0.206*** 0.206*** 0.206***
(9.67) (9.60) (9.44)
State-year 0.249*** 0.249*** 0.249***
(8.86) (8.83) (8.88)
Size 0.096*** 0.097*** 0.097***
(20.27) (20.38) (20.33)
Size-squared -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007***
(20.09) (20.42) (20.41)
Age -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.021***
(5.34) (5.44) (5.41)
Herfindahl 0.015 0.025*** 0.026***
(1.66) (2.58) (2.90)
Before(-2) x Herfindahl -0.003
(0.34)
Before(-1) x Herfindahl -0.016
(0.97)
Before(0) x Herfindahl -0.039***
(2.85)
After(1) x Herfindahl -0.041***
(4.15)
After(2+) x Herfindahl -0.033***
(4.24)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 79,474 77,460 77,481 77,460 77,460
Adj. R-squared 0.66 0.68 0.66 0.68 0.68
Dependent Variable: Return on Assets
Table IV 
Herfindahl Dummies 
 
Herfindahl < 50%, Herfindahl ≥ 50%, Herfindahl ≤ 35%, Herfindahl ∈ (35%, 65%), and Herfindahl ≥ 65% are dummy 
variables that equal one if the Herfindahl index lies in the specified range of its empirical distribution. All other vari-
ables are defined in Tables II and III. Standard errors are clustered at the state of incorporation level. The sample period 
is from 1976 to 1995. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4]
BC x Herfindahl < 50% -0.003 -0.002
(1.13) (0.49)
BC x Herfindahl ≥ 50% -0.010*** -0.011***
(4.28) (4.13)
BC x Herfindahl ≤ 35% -0.000 0.002
(0.13) (0.68)
BC x Herfindahl ∈ (35%, 65%) -0.008*** -0.008**
(3.33) (2.56)
BC x Herfindahl ≥ 65% -0.011*** -0.012***
(4.31) (4.59)
Industry-year 0.206*** 0.206***
(9.63) (9.61)
State-year 0.250*** 0.248***
(8.96) (8.77)
Size 0.096*** 0.097***
(20.04) (20.34)
Size-squared -0.007*** -0.007***
(19.92) (20.53)
Age -0.022*** -0.021***
(5.56) (5.37)
Herfindahl ≥ 50% 0.004
(1.51)
Herfindahl ∈ (35%, 65%) 0.006*
(1.88)
Herfindahl ≥ 65% 0.008**
(2.12)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 77,481 77,460 77,481 77,460
Adj. R-squared 0.66 0.68 0.66 0.68
Two Herfindahl Dummies Three Herfindahl Dummies
Dependent Variable: Return on Assets
 
 
Table V 
2- and 4-Digit Herfindahl Indices and Asset-Based Herfindahl Indices 
 
Asset-based Herfindahl indices are computed using total assets (COMPUSTAT item #6). All other variables are defined 
in Tables II and III. Standard errors are clustered at the state of incorporation level. The sample period is from 1976 to 
1995. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
BC -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.002 0.001
(0.15) (0.11) (0.10) (0.60) (0.19)
BC x Herfindahl (2-digit) -0.056***
(5.15)
BC x Herfindahl (4-digit) -0.022***
(3.23)
BC x Herfindahl (2-digit, assets) -0.053***
(5.27)
BC x Herfindahl (3-digit, assets) -0.037***
(4.73)
BC x Herfindahl (4-digit, assets) -0.021***
(3.25)
Industry-year 0.203*** 0.201*** 0.206*** 0.202*** 0.196***
(9.90) (9.72) (9.73) (9.34) (9.52)
State-year 0.251*** 0.249*** 0.248*** 0.246*** 0.253***
(8.76) (9.26) (8.78) (8.83) (9.09)
Size 0.096*** 0.096*** 0.096*** 0.097*** 0.096***
(19.30) (21.35) (19.38) (20.31) (21.23)
Size-squared -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007***
(18.57) (21.25) (19.23) (20.15) (20.96)
Age -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.020***
(5.21) (4.99) (5.07) (5.52) (4.96)
Herfindahl (2-digit) 0.011
(0.76)
Herfindahl (4-digit) 0.017**
(2.13)
Herfindahl (2-digit, assets) 0.027
(1.43)
Herfindahl (3-digit, assets) 0.033***
(4.15)
Herfindahl (4-digit, assets) 0.030***
(3.29)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 77,135 77,446 77,106 77,470 77,490
Adj. R-squared 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68
Dependent Variable: Return on Assets
Table VI 
1- and 2-Year Lagged Herfindahl Indices and Pre-1984 Average Herfindahl Index 
 
All variables are defined in Tables II and III. Standard errors are clustered at the state of incorporation level. The sam-
ple period is from 1976 to 1995. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively. 
 
 
Lagged Herfindahl Lagged Herfindahl Average Herfindahl
(1-year Lag) (2-year Lag) 1976-1984
[1] [2] [3]
BC 0.001 -0.000 0.003
(0.19) (0.05) (0.73)
BC x Herfindahl -0.029*** -0.024*** -0.028***
(4.63) (3.45) (4.82)
Industry-year 0.204*** 0.204*** 0.206***
(9.63) (9.76) (10.92)
State-year 0.244*** 0.248*** 0.252***
(8.54) (8.81) (9.09)
Size 0.097*** 0.097*** 0.096***
(20.42) (20.39) (20.60)
Size-squared -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007***
(20.28) (20.02) (20.63)
Age -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.021***
(5.14) (5.33) (5.09)
Herfindahl 0.035*** 0.032***
(3.88) (3.61)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 77,385 77,273 77,123
Adj. R-squared 0.68 0.68 0.68
Dependent Variable: Return on Assets
 
Table VII 
Non-Delaware and “Eventually Business Combination” Sub-samples 
 
Firms incorporated in Delaware are excluded from the treatment group in the “Non-Delaware” sub-sample. “Eventually 
Business Combination” is defined in Table II. All other variables are defined in Tables II and III. Standard errors are 
clustered at the state of incorporation level. The sample period is from 1976 to 1995. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, 
**, and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
Non-Delaware Eventually Business Combination
[1] [2]
BC 0.002 0.002
(0.04) (0.57)
BC x Herfindahl -0.032** -0.032***
(2.41) (4.74)
Industry-year 0.232*** 0.189***
(10.30) (14.27)
State-year 0.260*** 0.237***
(7.02) (12.63)
Size 0.092*** 0.096***
(14.25) (19.51)
Size-squared -0.007*** -0.007***
(13.64) (18.27)
Age -0.019*** -0.023***
(3.63) (6.19)
Herfindahl 0.031** 0.025**
(2.28) (2.39)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 55,920 66,623
Adj. R-squared 0.68 0.69
Dependent Variable: Return on Assets
Table VIII 
Alternative Performance Measures 
 
Return on assets (after depreciation) is operating income after depreciation and amortization (COMPUSTAT item #178) 
divided by total assets (item #6). Return on equity is net income (item #172) divided by the book value of common 
equity (item #60). Return on sales is operating income before depreciation and amortization (item #13) divided by sales 
(item #12). All other variables are defined in Tables II and III. Standard errors are clustered at the state of incorporation 
level. The sample period is from 1976 to 1995. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
Return on Assets
(after Depreciation)
[1] [2] [3]
BC 0.000 -0.001 0.000
(0.06) (0.36) (0.03)
BC x Herfindahl -0.031*** -0.035*** -0.032***
(4.73) (3.24) (2.74)
Industry-year 0.243*** 0.234*** 0.143***
(8.95) (12.02) (9.98)
State-year 0.254*** 0.137*** 0.181***
(7.56) (5.09) (5.17)
Size 0.111*** 0.090*** 0.104***
(22.53) (17.70) (11.25)
Size-squared -0.008*** -0.005*** -0.007***
(21.93) (11.62) (9.37)
Age -0.037*** -0.017*** -0.068***
(8.77) (4.48) (8.41)
Herfindahl 0.021** 0.028** 0.021
(2.11) (2.22) (1.17)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 78,698 73,571 76,412
Adj. R-squared 0.67 0.66 0.43
Return on Sales Return on Equity
 
 
Table IX 
Manufacturing Industries 
 
Herfindahl (Census) is the Herfindahl index computed by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. The index is only available for 
4-digit SIC manufacturing industries for the years 1982, 1987, and 1992 during the sample period. Import penetration is 
defined as imports divided by the sum of total shipments minus exports plus imports. The import data is only available 
for 4-digit SIC manufacturing industries and is obtained from Peter Schott’s webpage and described in Feenstra (1996) 
and Feenstra, Romalis and Schott (2002). All other variables are defined in Tables II and III. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the state of incorporation level. The sample period is from 1976 to 1995. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, 
and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
[1] [2] [3]
BC 0.003 -0.003 0.003
(0.67) (0.83) (0.27)
BC x Herfindahl -0.035***
(3.08)
BC x Herfindahl (Census) -0.081***
(2.84)
BC x (1 - Import Penetration) -0.017
(1.15)
Industry-year 0.188*** 0.148*** 0.202***
(9.96) (6.21) (8.08)
State-year 0.277*** 0.284*** 0.333***
(7.64) (3.99) (6.26)
Size 0.111*** 0.115*** 0.123***
(21.14) (13.13) (16.80)
Size-squared -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.009***
(20.52) (12.45) (15.40)
Age -0.034*** -0.043*** -0.030***
(5.07) (5.39) (3.00)
Herfindahl 0.036***
(3.13)
1 - Import Penetration 0.052**
(2.25)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 35,371 19,244 20,250
Adj. R-squared 0.70 0.73 0.71
Dependent Variable: Return on Assets
 
 
  
Table X 
 Serial and Cross-Sectional Correlation 
 
The methods employed to correct for serial and cross-sectional correlation of the error terms are described in Section 
3.3. All variables are defined in Tables II and III. The sample period is from 1976 to 1995. t-statistics are in parenthe-
ses; p-values are in brackets. *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
AR(1)-GLS Block Bootstrapping Time Collapsing Cross-Sectional Collapsing
[1] [2] [3] [4]
BC 0.003 0.001 -0.001 0.002
(0.98) [0.805] (0.56) (0.97)
BC x Herfindahl -0.032*** -0.033*** -0.015** -0.020***
(3.90) [0.000] (2.52) (2.59)
Industry-year 0.168*** 0.206***
(13.94) [0.000]
State-year 0.176*** 0.249***
(7.11) [0.000]
Size 0.114*** 0.097***
(54.69) [0.000]
Size-squared -0.008*** -0.007***
(38.93) [0.000]
Age -0.020*** -0.021***
(6.80) [0.000]
Herfindahl 0.012 0.025**
(1.45) [0.025]
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Portfolio Fixed Effects No No No Yes
Observations 66,739 77,460 10,192 26,344
Adj. R-squared 0.72 0.68 0.00 0.42
Dependent Variable: Return on Assets
 
 
  
Table XI 
Empire Building or Quiet Life? 
 
Capital expenditures (investment) are property, plant, and equipment capital expenditures (COMPUSTAT item #30) divided by total assets (item #6). Selling, general & admin. 
expenses (overhead) are SG&A expenses (item #189) divided by total assets. Advertising expenses (item #45) and costs of goods sold (item #41) are divided by sales (item #12). R&D 
expenses (item #46) are divided by total assets. Wages (real) are the natural logarithm of labor and related expenses (item #42) divided by the number of employees (item #29) and 
deflated by the consumer price index (CPI) from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. All other variables are defined in Tables II and III. Standard errors are clustered at the state of 
incorporation level. The sample period is from 1976 to 1995. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
Selling, General & 
Admin. Expenses
(Overhead)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
BC -0.000 0.005 0.000 0.001 -0.002 -0.003
(0.27) (0.80) (0.59) (0.49) (0.20) (0.12)
BC x Herfindahl 0.001 0.029** 0.003 0.007 0.053** 0.103**
(0.18) (2.51) (1.04) (1.39) (2.44) (2.00)
Industry-year 0.258*** 0.110*** 0.001 0.333*** 0.101*** 0.087***
(10.92) (5.47) (0.04) (8.50) (3.97) (3.49)
State-year 0.246*** 0.013 0.106*** 0.173*** 0.038 0.003
(6.20) (0.42) (2.77) (3.28) (1.38) (0.09)
Size 0.013*** -0.286*** 0.001 -0.068*** -0.134*** -0.110***
(4.08) (25.05) (0.96) (4.47) (4.49) (4.49)
Size-squared -0.001*** 0.019*** -0.000 0.005*** 0.008*** 0.007***
(2.72) (17.56) (0.96) (4.00) (3.72) (4.73)
Age -0.034*** 0.117*** -0.008*** 0.024** 0.000 0.109***
(10.96) (12.10) (12.27) (2.66) (0.00) (6.26)
Herfindahl -0.009 -0.056*** 0.005** -0.010 -0.073** -0.115
(1.35) (3.27) (2.04) (1.47) (2.11) (0.89)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 74,435 68,561 28,389 39,359 74,758 8,651
Adj. R-squared 0.55 0.81 0.80 0.76 0.60 0.89
Capital Expenditures 
(Investment) R&D ExpensesAdvertising Expenses Costs of Goods Sold Wages (Real)
 
Table XII 
Event-Study Results 
 
The methodology used to calculate cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) is described in Section 4. The event date is the 
date of the first newspaper report about the respective BC law. The two-day event window is [-1,0]. The numbers re-
ported in the table are average portfolio CARs based on 19 state- or state-Herfindahl (sub-)portfolios, respectively. The 
19 states are Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New 
Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, South Carolina, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. z-
statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
≤ 1/2 > 1/2 ≤ 1/3 ∈ (1/3, 2/3) ≥ 2/3
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
[-40, -2] 0.98 1.25 0.61 1.51 2.11 -0.30
(1.44) (1.40) (0.49) (1.53) (1.13) (0.04)
[-30, -2] 0.43 0.83 0.08 0.78 0.52 -0.34
(0.94) (1.08) (0.07) (1.02) (0.36) (0.07)
[-20, -2] 0.08 0.15 -0.01 0.33 -0.07 -0.41
(0.53) (0.47) (0.22) (0.78) (-0.03) (0.15)
[-10, -2] 0.52 0.44 0.57 0.44 1.15 0.10
(1.35) (1.31) (0.54) (1.19) (1.24) (0.21)
[-3, -2] -0.02 0.22 -0.24 0.38 0.09 -0.24
(0.05) (0.47) (-0.50) (0.75) (-0.26) (-0.25)
[-1, 0] -0.32*** -0.10 -0.54** 0.08 -0.44* -0.67**
(-2.58) (-1.29) (-2.36) (-0.53) (-1.67) (-2.31)
[1, 2] 0.09 -0.03 0.20 0.01 0.25 0.03
(0.37) (0.07) (0.45) (-0.05) (1.02) (-0.28)
[1, 10] -0.07 0.03 -0.17 0.30 -0.74 -0.27
(-0.08) (0.07) (-0.07) (0.78) (-0.53) (-0.61)
Herfindahl Herfindahl
All
 
 
